When Hibbard took a break from his own worries, he read the newspaper or listened to the radio. Nothing there soothed his mind or gave hope for the year ahead. Strikes, violence, and political marches plagued the country. A year ago, at the beginning of 1930, life had been simple for clerks and factory workers unless they had borrowed money or bet their last paycheck on the stock market. The only people who were out on the street were those who were already poor and speculators who had danced to the tune of Wall Street ticker tapes. The charmed life of ultra-wealthy investors, such as the Rockefellers and Kennedys, continued unblemished, provided they had liquidated their stocks six months before the crash, on the hush-hush advice of their brokers at Kuhn, Loeb & Company or J. P. Morgan.

By December, however, the crack in America’s economic framework had widened. People learned to live with less money, but that left less money in circulation for the next guy to make and spend. When luxury items sold slower, shopkeepers let employees go. Then, businesses cut back because they sold less to the luxury buyer and to the unemployed clerks. Finally, factory workers found themselves unemployed and buying very little.

Amazingly, with four or five million Americans out of work, a number almost double that of nine months earlier, citizens had more important issues on their minds. According to a National Economic League poll, unemployment was number four in their list of issues, behind prohibition, administration of justice, and lawlessness. Thanks to gangsters and bootleggers who greased the open palm on the long arm of the law, people who previously ignored prohibition in private ignored it in public.

Meanwhile, President Herbert Hoover saw himself as the watchdog of the Treasury, with an international basket full of problems, such as tariffs, embargos, and quotas. Frederick Lewis Allen wrote in his book, Since Yesterday, “It had been obvious to anybody beyond the infant class in economics that the United States could neither have a flourishing export, nor collect the huge sums owing it from abroad, unless it either lent foreign countries the money with which to pay, or else permitted imports in quantity.”

At home, Hoover held firm his convictions about average Americans and their rugged individualism. Unemployment relief should not come out of Federal funds, he believed, but out of charities and state and local appropriations. Regardless of the golden words he spun in favor of self-help, the economy turned to straw. Allen summed up Hoover’s predicament: “To hungry farmers in Arkansas, the President who would lend them Federal money to feed their animals but not to feed their children seemed callous.” With his popularity tangled up in the economic tailspin, he could please no one. In the icy North, men and women huddled, discontentedly, in their Hoover Ville shanties and dreamed of the warm Florida sunshine.

Hibbard enjoyed that sunshine, but once again, his problem was keeping Mel focused on something other than their financial situation. Most seasonal residents in Winter Park did not dull the social festivities with such unpleasant talk but talked about the symphony orchestra Mel’s Aunt Mae had founded several years earlier, the newest crazes backgammon and miniature golf, or the convenience of airmail service thanks to Colonel Charles Lindberg. What about movie star Jean Harlow or golfing great Bobby Jones?

On the other side of his dual life, Hibbard was more of a workingman than ever before. His workers and floral customers were outside of the bubble of the elite and he could sympathize with them when they talked openly about issues closer to their pocketbooks. The state had yanked away the welcome mat for the average Joe wanting to come in. Patrolmen guarding the orders turned back indigent transients. The state already had more poor than it could handle. While the huge crack in the state’s coffers had put Governor Carlton on the hot seat, he made no public statement on banking issues.

Despite all the bankers in his corner, Florida’s constitution hobbled Governor Carlton, because of its prohibition against borrowing of money, even for emergencies or on a matching basis. When the 1931 Legislature convened, politicians increased the sales tax. They also legalized gambling. In that regard, money was money, and it was all welcome. However, Governor Carlton vetoed an inheritance tax, a move Hibbard could agree with. The state had enough problems without alienating wealthy who might take their dollars back North rather than invest here.

Locally, the City of Winter Park raised taxes and sold its water and light plant to pay off the bonds it had incurred for those improvements. However, its leaders still had no answer on how to pay for those confounded “cheap bone buster” bricks laid out in the boom days.

Walking the tightrope of financial solvency, Hibbard tried to stay one-step ahead of Barnett and the bankers. In building Winter Park Ferneries, he had enticed investors and friends to join him as fernery owners, as well as stockholders. Mel, now pregnant with their third child, had invested her personal funds. Family members invested with Hibbard, in part, to protect her and the children. When he sold property, he often took back mortgages on whatever terms he could get. In turn, those mortgages became collateral that Hibbard pledged as security to the bank for the next loan.

Hibbard intended this middleman position to be a temporary source of relief, not to make him its slave or to be his savior. However, he would depend on it repeatedly to get much-needed injections of cash, save a business, buy land, or pay off another loan. He knew he had to pay the bank regardless of whether or not he received the payments due him. Sometimes he was only as good as the credit he could get. But good credit, a successful image and keeping his word had been the reasons why his grandfather’s firm not only survived, but thrived after the Great Fire. Now they were Hibbard’s best tools for survival.

The best tool President Hoover found for a world’s economic dilemma was a one-year moratorium he used to put the brakes on inter-governmental debts. When he did, the world breathed a collective sigh of relief. The stock markets rejoiced, flashing briefly upward in Europe and New York. When life looked promising, even in Fern Park, Hibbard lightly polished his latest idea and marched across enemy lines. He offered to purchase all of Barnett’s land and the holdings of Gordon J. Barnett, Inc. for $29,000 ($384,000). Of course, Hibbard had no cash. He never felt he needed money if he had a good idea, and all his ideas were good to him. Instead, he offered Barnett 1,162 shares of Winter Park Ferneries stock.

The goal of Hibbard’s plan was not unlike that of the Rothschilds and J. P. Morgan. He and Barnett would join their companies in a way that would eliminate destructive competition and create a basis to work in unison, represent their stockholders and better control prices in their market. To Barnett, the Trojan horse would have looked good considering the depressing alternatives.

On June 24, 1931, Barnett accepted the offer but not without adding two specific clauses in their contract to keep a tight leash on Hibbard. First, Barnett would be an employee and vice president of Winter Park Ferneries. Second, he could cancel the agreement and repurchase his company’s land and assets at any time in the next two years. Hibbard took the deal. Unfortunately, when the economy worsened, no one cared about the price of ferns or their land.

In September 1931, Germany’s Danat Bank closed. In an effort to save the pound, England abandoned the gold standard. American banks, with their safes already crammed full of worthless bonds and mortgages, found their foreign bonds on the slide. Historians argued over why, with some believing the move was a ploy by England to regain control over the United States’ dollar, making the pound the world’s preeminent currency once again. Regardless of the reason, another 305 banks collapsed; 522 followed in October. People began to hoard what little money they had left.

While Hibbard tried to keep the business stable in 1932, he and Mel welcomed their daughter Molly to the world that February. She would be the highlight of Hibbard’s year, and a novel addition for their two boys. Like other parents, they must have been shocked to hear the news about the kidnapping of one toddler in New Jersey. The story wiped Hoover, the Depression, and Europe off the front page of the newspapers. Reporter H. L. Mencken called the kidnapping of Charles A, Lindbergh, Jr. “The biggest story since the Resurrection.” Despite the massive investigation, and the payment of two ransoms, the boy was not returned. When the headlines flashed, “Baby Dead” that May, America mourned with the Lindbergh family.

In June, the Dow hit its worst level, dropping to 40.56 or another 89% from its pre-crash highs. The results must have pushed Hibbard and Barnett on further to the edge. A quarter of American unemployed workers, including teachers and farmers, found themselves sucked into a black hole. With ninety-seven percent of West Virginia miners out of work, entire towns shut down. The homeless wandered around the country, drifting, thumbing rides, and hopping freight cars to anywhere. Of these drifters, 200,000 were children, many orphans. Other people, unable to pay their rent or mortgage, now lived shanties, packing boxes, and doorways of empty buildings. People stood in breadlines or scrounged around in rubbish cans for what morsels they could find.

Those people fortunate enough to have a paycheck never knew how close they were to becoming like the beggar they passed on the street. With greatly diminished lifestyles, women who had never touched a needle sewed and mended their clothes. Men passed up the thirty-five cent ($5.30) lunch at the diner in favor of a sandwich brought from home. More than ever before, business owners cut back on employees, and invented laborsaving devices. That meant employees worked harder to get their jobs, harder to keep them, and got paid less for their effort. Still, businesses lost between $5 and 6 billion ($75.9 and $91 billion. ATT paid $85.8 billion for BellSouth in 2006). The more well-to-do received less dividend income, forcing them to give up some of their social perks, such as golf membership, beach vacations, and household help.

When Hibbard read the international news, it gave no hope; Hitler’s Brown Shirts became more prevalent in Germany. Without the rebound to prosperity, Americans became curious and intrigued with the Soviet Union, a country devoid of democracy. Rollins College president, Dr. Hamilton Holt stated, “World economics are more important the ever before,” and the effects of the “experiment” going on in Russia “will be equally profound, whether the experiment succeeds or fails.” Statewide, Hibbard probably glanced over the Florida citrus growers’ gripes about California oranges coming into the state. In South Florida, the staggering $60 million debt ($885.5 million) debt run up by Miami and Dade County weighed in at three times the size of Jacksonville and Duval County’s debt combined, though it had a comparable population. What Hibbard did worry about were his family, friends, investors, employees, and customers, all spread about the country, dealing with their own problems.

Meanwhile, there were rays of sunshine in Winter Park. Its residents went along with Hoover’s anti-hoarding plea to get money into circulation, and the “Buy in Winter Park” campaign kept it circulating locally. Rarely did anyone design and build a luxury home in 1932, but Robert Bruce Barbour wanted Gamble Rogers to do just that. Strangely, two sources quote Gamble about how the commission came about. One says that Barbour, a chemist who discovered the bluing used to whiten clothes, admired Gamble’s personal residence, “Four Winds.” In the other, Gamble purportedly said, “Barbour, then, in the course of his travels, came upon my Traylor House – actually one of several along similar lines I had designed in Casselberry (then the subdivision of Winter Park Gladiolus Gardens). Barbour resolved, ‘That’s the man I want to design my house.’”

Gamble designed both “Four Winds” and the Traylor house in the same French provincial style. However, when Barbour gave him architectural freedom on a premier lot on the shores of Lake Osceola, Gamble presented an Andalusia Cortijo home. After scouring around looking for just the right materials, he found foot-thick walls recovered from the razed Orlando Armory and left over Spanish roof tiles, imported from Barcelona during the land boom. Gamble contemplated every factor of his design, but outside that magical world, life became more challenging for the less affluent. Winter Park writer, Irving Batchelor would recount:

“The worst depression of history was upon us. It is a small city of scarcely 4,000 people, many of whom have suffered from a double depression, the first of which was the bursting of the land boom. That led to grave trouble. The two banks were filled with frozen assets. Both made heroic efforts to save their depositors. One had to give up, but not until its capital had been once restored. The directors of the other replaced its capital twice, and solely to save its depositors. It was about the highest grade of financial heroism of which I know.”

Financial heroism failed to extend into Fern Park, however. Winter Park Ferneries maintained only a small cushion for the repair and replacement of the fernery sheds or slat houses. Hibbard deemed the reserve a necessity; others wanted it disbursed as dividends. While he believed his course of action would bring the company through the hardship, Hibbard wasn’t one to talk his plans out first with his stockholders. As a result, some felt Hibbard callously ignored their stock shares and input.

A lot could be said for that point. Hibbard had not stopped to ask his shareholders for approval when he extravagantly purchased Barnett’s land using Winter Park Ferneries stock, or before he brought Barnett on as Vice President. Instead, Hibbard informed them about the changes three weeks later. Given his past actions and the current economic times, stockholders wanted to know about Hibbard’s plans in advance and have a chance to cast their vote. Hibbard took his job seriously, but probably saw his investors as people who invested in him and his vision, and not an actual Board of Directors voicing, of all things, a different view.

Mel was the exception and the one person he could not ignore. She often took an interest in Hibbard’s work, but, as much as they had invested, it was most likely her defensive move against his infernal optimism. Hibbard had mentioned making a distribution to the stockholders to her, but between the stockholders and the Depression, Hibbard felt he was doing the right thing.

Before heading into the fernery office, Hibbard sat down for a light breakfast made by their housekeeper, Oretha, a robust, middle-aged black woman. He appreciated her jovial personality and the warmth she brought to their home. However, it was her rich delectable cooking that caused him to loosen his belt another notch or two. Between bites, Hibbard balanced his attention between his family and the newspaper. The society section heralded the 1933 winter social season, with its concerts, teas, and parties, albeit a few less than in previous years. That was Mel’s domain, however. Taking the front page, Hibbard read how President Hoover worked tirelessly for economic recovery, despite an assassination attempt in Miami, and even after his political defeat. On February 13, 1933, Hoover regretfully addressed Republicans in New York. He told them the country should inflate its currency, abandon the gold standard, “and with our depreciated currency attempt to enter a world economic war, with the certainty that it leads to complete destruction, both at home and abroad. But if we are asked for sacrifices because of such injury, we should have assurances of cooperation that will positively result in monetary stability, and the restoration of world prosperity.” Again, the Federal Reserve printed money, the government loaned it to other countries, they paid off their bankers, and Americans sank deeper into debt.

In March 1933, Hibbard turned forty and Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave his inaugural speech. “We have nothing to fear but fear itself,” he told Americans. Hibbard did not feel fearful, but he was far from comfortable. He wanted to pay stockholders a dividend, keep Mel happy and their children secure, and grow the company. And it would be nice to have Barnett off his back. Putting that wish list aside, Hibbard looked for ways to get his company through the dismal market.

Barnett, however, considered Hibbard a foolish and arrogant man, who needed to be defeated, as voters had finally defeated Comptroller Ernest Amos. For nearly two years, Hibbard had ignored Barnett’s request to re-issue his 1,162 shares of stock incorrectly written at their merger. On the contrary, Hibbard pushed Barnett to renegotiate the amount and take $6,000 ($90,000) less than he was due. Hibbard knew he had no legal right to refuse Barnett but countered with the affect the full payment would have on the company’s cash reserves.

Unlike his boisterous president, Barnett probably smoldered because the contract did not require him to take less. Words meant something to him, especially in his contracts. For Hibbard to ignore the fact that they represented a binding legal agreement must have incensed Barnett. Finding no resolution, he squarely let Hibbard know that their stockholders would not approve of their president’s unfair action. After planting that challenge, Barnett said no more.

After a while, Hibbard noticed an underlying current around the office. Maybe it began with a few whispers, followed by a quick hush when he entered the room. He questioned Gamble about the uneasiness. As treasurer, Gamble understood both sides of stock struggle, but he also knew many of the stockholders were tired of Hibbard’s overbearing attitude. When Hibbard questioned two other directors, Ada Mundorff and Dr. George Owen, separately, they conceded only that Barnett promoted dissention. Hibbard probably sensed that much, but like Barnett, the directors remained tight-lipped.

On June 4, 1933, more than dissention appeared: directors Gordon Barnett, Gamble Rogers, and Ada Mundorff wanted to hold a corporate meeting in five days, although the Florida Statutes required a minimum of ten. They planned to consider extending the two-year contract with Barnett’s company, Gordon J. Barnett, Inc., and continue discussions about buying back stock of the corporation from its stockholders. Not underestimating his vice-president, Hibbard asked his attorney George Garrett to attend the meeting with him.

The only thing Hibbard could be assured of on June 9 was another hot sultry day, somewhere in the nineties, where the tropical heat drained a person’s energy hour after hour, until the late afternoon thunderstorms brought a brief reprieve. With a 9 a.m. meeting, Hibbard could tolerate being in a coat for a while. When he and Garrett walked into the meeting, Mrs. Mundorff, Dr. Owen, and Gamble were ready for business. Then Barnett arrived, and shortly thereafter, his attorney Fred Scott. 

After signing a waiver of notice and two hours of conventional business, the near noon sun penetrated the office. Garrett left, thinking nothing would come of his client’s suspicions. Instinct told Hibbard differently, so before he let Garrett go, he double-checked his stock position. Of the company’s 4,310 shares, he owned 1,335 shares personally; Mel owned 144; his mother Lilian, another 104 shares. Mr. Meyer in Ontario held 300 shares; Jim Glaser in Chicago held another 340. He knew they trusted his judgment, so he put them on his side. With the two shares held by his attorney George Garrett, and four owned by the estate of his late attorney Vans Agnew. That represented 2,229 shares in his control. Of the 1,162 shares Barnett had received for his company, he only owned 980 shares personally. The rest were owned by Barnett’s other stockholders. With a 1,249 margin of safety, Hibbard let Garrett leave.

Having out lasted his adversary’s legal defense, Barnett’s tone flipped like a light switch. He stood to address the board, speaking clearly and precisely. There were two main purposes mentioned in the call. First was that relative to the buying back of stock by the company. This he would take up after considering the contract extensions between Winter Park Ferneries and Gordon J Barnett, Inc. He had several proposals that needed the directors’ approval. If they could reach an agreement on those, he would present the extension contract.

Barnett brought up a letter dated June 24, 1931, that he had written when he turned back his original stock certificate for $29,050 bearing Hibbard’s signature. He explained how he had called on Hibbard to deliver the stock, but without results. Barnett then requested the immediate re-issue of the stock. Mrs. Mundorff made a motion; Dr. Owen seconded it. Hibbard and Barnett refrained as the others voted aye. When Gamble instructed Hibbard to sign over the stock, he complied.

Next, Barnett wanted to consider the amount of money the company owed him, approximately $2,000 ($30,000). In signing their original agreement, Barnett had turned over the accounts receivable of his fern business as a loan to replace working capital, just as Hibbard had loaned the company $7,000 ($105,000). The loans were to be repaid proportionately. Hibbard had not only repaid his own loan the loan in its entirety, he overdrew the account by $2,000 ($32,000). The same three directors agreed Barnett should be paid, but he reassured them there was no hurry.

As if on cue, Dr. Owen questioned how Hibbard had been paying the bills. Gamble examined the by-laws. Checks should be issued and signed by the Treasurer and then countersigned by the President. Mrs. Munsdorff looked at Hibbard. “Why is this not being done?”

Again, Hibbard had broad-brushed small details in favor of expediency. He had instructed the bank to accept only the signature of Gamble, Noble Hale, or himself on a check and not worry about a countersignature. Two signatures were impractical and could lead to confusion, he justified. The group agreed to meet monthly and review the finances in accordance with the by-laws.

Hibbard wanted to end the inquest, but Barnett had more on his private agenda. Barnett asked about the Brockington sale, in which he expected to receive stock in exchange for deeds he delivered to the Florida Bank. When he went there, Hibbard had already collected it.

Challenged again, Hibbard explained about expenses the company had to pay for title insurance. When Barnett reminded him that the company still owed him sufficient money to cover the debts, Hibbard signed over another 114 shares of stock. As pendulum of control swung further from his reach, a letter from Winifred E. Lampp was presented, regarding stock to be issued to her in return for her fernery. Not surprisingly, her stock should be delivered to Barnett, as trustee, after the payment of necessary costs.

Dr. Owen asked if there ever been an audit of the company's books. While Hibbard had never felt the necessity of going outside, the group disagreed and instructed him to have representatives of auditing companies present at the next meeting.

With his attorney Fred Scott at his side, Barnett finally sighted Hibbard in the crosshairs. He wanted to discuss if the company would buy the ferneries he had previously offered to sell in exchange for stock. Barnett explained that he did not own the ferneries yet, but he held past due mortgages. He made it sound as if foreclosing on a mortgage was as simple as signing a check. Again, he said they should not worry. He would settle with the current owner – in exchange for stock he wanted to receive first. For stock. For stock. Hibbard could hear the words echo even in his deaf ear.

When Dr. Owen asked if they were good ferneries, Barnett presented the production records for the ones operated by the company. Two were the best producing ferneries the company handled, he said. The others were too new to have numbers on. All were contiguous to ones the company own, therefore economical to operate. The other directors said that the last ferneries the company had purchased were for $5,500 ($83,000) per acre. Consequently, from a cost standpoint, the price of $5,000 ($75,000) appeared advantageous. This move appeared to further Hibbard’s desire to reduce the value on the books of $6,000 ($90,000) per acre.

Mrs. Munsdorff made the motion to approve the purchases, seconded by Gamble. Hibbard cast the lone dissenting vote. Then Barnett turned to Gamble with a maneuver so creative it would have impressed even boom era bankers. He offered a non-negotiable note for $10,000 ($150,000) bearing 4% interest to be held as collateral for the stock until he got the titles transferred into his name.

When that red flag went up, Hibbard started hammering Barnett. How long before the title could be transferred? To go through a possible foreclosure would take up to a year, Barnett responded. A note worthless to anyone else, payable a year later hardly equaled the par value of the stock that he could vote immediately, Hibbard countered. Further, neither Mrs. Mundorff, nor Dr. Owen, inspected the title or the ferneries themselves. Barnett assured them they were good and that seemed sufficient.

Seeing Barnett’s game clearly, Hibbard fired back that the ferneries were not worth $5,000 ($75,000) an acre, but about $2,000 ($30,000) each in their present condition. True, in the past, when prices were better and the market more active, ferneries were worth considerably more. But if the land did belong to Barnett – which it did not – and if it were in full production – only a part of it was – it would still only be worth a total of $4,000 ($60,000). Other properties could be purchased as low as $1,000 ($15,000) per acre. This made the offer two and a half times market value. 

Barnett contended the ferneries were good, and he would eventually deliver title. The directors agreed and motioned for Gamble to accept the note. This should have tied up Barnett’s control, but if they expected Hibbard simply to sign over the stock, they did not know him at all. He flatly refused.

“When no agreement could be reached, it was apparent that the will of the directors was to be flouted.” Mrs. Mundorff explained later how the directors examined their remedies under the company’s by-laws. The only solution: Hibbard should resign as president of Winter Park Ferneries. Barnett and the directors had him in check. No matter which way Hibbard moved, it appeared he was out of the game – and out of a job.